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Lending 
Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
In this paper, we survey recent theoretical and empirical work that relates to 
the “lending” channel of monetary policy transmission. To begin, we need to 
define clearly what is meant by the lending channel. It is perhaps easiest to do 
so by contrasting the lending view of monetary policy transmission  with the 
simpler, and better-known,  “money” view. 
In what we take to be the polar, pure money version of the monetary trans- 
mission mechanism, there are effectively only two assets-money  and bonds. 
In this world, the banking sector’s only special role has to do with the liability 
side of  its balance sheet-the  fact that it can create money by issuing demand 
deposits. On the asset side of their balance sheets, banks do nothing unique- 
like the household sector, they too just invest in bonds. 
In this two-asset world, monetary nonneutrality arises if movements in re- 
serves affect real interest rates. The transmission works as follows: a decrease 
in reserves reduces the banking sector’s ability to issue demand deposits. As 
a matter of accounting, this implies that the banking  sector must also hold 
(on net) fewer bonds. Thus the household sector must hold less money, and 
more bonds. If prices do not adjust fully and instantaneously, households will 
have less money in real terms, and equilibrium will require an increase in real 
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interest rates. This in turn can have real effects on investment, and ultimately, 
on aggregate economic activity. 
Note that as we have defined the pure money view of the transmission mech- 
anism-solely  by reference to the fact that it is characterized by the simple 
two-asset feature-there  is a wide range of alternative formulations that cap- 
ture its essence. These include the textbook IS-LM model, as well as the dy- 
namic equilibriudcash-in  advance models of  Rotemberg (  1984), Grossman 
and Weiss (1983), Lucas (1990), and Christian0 and Eichenbaum (1992). Al- 
though these two classes of models differ along a number of dimensions (for 
example, in the way they generate incomplete price adjustment), they share the 
two-asset feature. 
By contrast, we say there is a distinct lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission  when the two-asset simplification  is inappropriate in a specific 
sense. In  the lending  view,  there  are three  assets-money,  publicly  issued 
bonds, and intermediated “loans”-that  differ from each other in meaningful 
ways and must be accounted for separately when analyzing the impact of mon- 
etary policy shocks. The banking sector now can be special in two relevant 
ways:  in addition  to creating money,  it makes  loans, which  (unlike buying 
bonds) the household sector cannot do. 
In this three-asset world,  monetary policy  can work not only through  its 
impact on the bond-market rate of interest, but also through its independent 
impact on the supply of intermediated  loans. To  think about the distinction 
between  the  money  and lending  channels,  take  an extreme example  where 
households view the two assets that they do hold-money  and bonds-as  very 
close substitutes. In this case, a decrease in reserves that leads to a decline in 
the money supply will have a minimal impact on the interest rate on publicly 
held bonds. Thus the money channel is very weak. However, the decrease in 
reserves  can still have important real consequences,  if it leads banks to cut 
back on loan supply: the cost of loans relative to bonds will rise, and those 
firms that rely on bank lending (say, because they do not have access to public 
bond markets) will be led to cut back on investment. Put differently, monetary 
policy can have significant real effects that are not summarized by  its conse- 
quences for open-market interest rates. 
A couple of points about the lending view should be emphasized right away, 
to prevent further confusion.  First,  as we have defined it, the lending view 
centers on the premise that bank loans and publicly issued bonds are not per- 
fect substitutes. It does not hinge critically on whether or not there is quantity 
rationing in the loan market. As a matter of practical reality, shifts in bank loan 
supply may well be accompanied by variations in the degree of rationing, but 
this is not necessary for there to be a meaningful lending channel. 
Second, much like with the pure money view, the essence of the lending 
view can probably be captured in a wide range of models.  This may not be 
immediately  apparent, because  the lending channel has received  much less 
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attempts that we know of are essentially extensions of the IS-LM framework, 
most notably Bernanke and Blinder (1988). However, as we will argue below, 
the important aspects of the lending view transcend the specific IS-LM style 
formulation adopted by Bernanke and Blinder; for example, they could in prin- 
ciple be captured in dynamic equilibriudcash-in-advance  models also. 
Having defined (loosely) what  we  mean  by  the distinction between the 
money and the lending channels, much of the remainder of this paper focuses 
on the following two sets of questions: 
1. As a matter of theory, what “microfoundations” are required for a distinct 
lending channel to exist? Does it appear that the necessary preconditions for a 
lending channel are satisfied in today’s financial environment? Are they apt to 
be satisfied in the future? 
2. Is there any direct evidence that supports the existence of a distinct lend- 
ing channel? If so, how important in magnitude is the lending channel? 
Before proceeding, however, there is a logically prior question that must 
be addressed, namely: Why is the distinction between the money and lending 
channels an interesting or important one? Although we must defer a complete 
answer until later in the paper, we can offer several brief observations: 
1. If the lending view is correct, monetary policy can have important effects 
on investment and aggregate activity without moving open-market rates by 
much. At  the least, this suggests that one might wish to look to alternative 
indicators to help gauge the stance of policy. 
2. Standard investment and inventory models-which  typically use open- 
market rates as a measure of  the cost of  financing-may  give a misleading 
picture of the extent to which different sectors are directly affected by mone- 
tary policy. For example, most empirical work fails to find a significant connec- 
tion between inventories and interest rates. As we argue below, it is probably 
wrong to conclude from this work that tight monetary policy cannot have  a 
strong direct impact on inventory behavior. 
3. The quantitative importance of the lending channel is likely to be sensitive 
to  a  number  of  institutional characteristics  of  the  financial  markets  (for 
example, the rise of “nonbank banks,” the development of the public “junk 
bond” market, etc.). Thus understanding the lending channel is a prerequisite 
to understanding how innovation in financial institutions might influence the 
potency of monetary policy. 
4. Similarly, the aggregate impact of the lending channel may depend on the 
financial condition of the banking sector. As we argue below, when bank capi- 
tal is depleted (and particularly when bank loan making is tied to risk-based 
capital requirements), the lending channel is likely to be weaker. This has obvi- 
ous implications for the ability of monetary policy to offset particular sorts of 
adverse shocks. 
5. Finally, the lending view implies that monetary policy can have distribu- 
tional  consequences  that  would  not  arise  were  policy  transmitted  solely 
through a money channel. For example, the lending view  suggests that the 224  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
costs of  tight policy  might fall disproportionately on smaller firms that are 
unable to access public capital markets. Such distributional considerations may 
be important to bear in mind when formulating policy. 
Although this list is  far from exhaustive, it hopefully gives some idea of the 
potential usefulness of understanding and quantifying the lending view. With 
this motivation in mind, the remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 7.1 gives a very brief history of the thought surrounding the lending 
view. Section 7.2 examines its microfoundations. Section 7.3 reviews the evi- 
dence that bears most directly on the lending view. 
7.1  Early Work on the Lending View 
The lending view of monetary policy transmission has, in one form or an- 
other, been  around for a long time. Much of  the early work tended to blur 
together  two logically  distinct issues: (a)  whether monetary policy  works in 
part by changing the relative costs of bank loans and open-market paper; and 
(b)  whether such shifts in bank loan supply are accompanied by variations in 
the degree of nonprice credit rationing. 
Roosa’s (1951) “availability  doctrine” is a classic example of  this  line of 
thinking. He takes issue with the simple money channel view that “changes in 
market rates of interest provided  a satisfactory explanation for cyclical eco- 
nomic disturbance. . . .  The postwar experience suggests that yield changes of 
scarcely Ys of  1 percent for the longest-term bonds have considerable market 
effects.” Rather,  Roosa argues, “it is the lender, neglected  by  the  monetary 
theorists, who does most to put new substance in the older doctrine. . . . Rate 
changes brought about by  the open market operations of the central bank in- 
fluence the disposition or the ability of lenders to make funds available to bor- 
rowers. . . . It is principally  through effects upon the position and decision of 
lenders . . . that central bank  action  . . . achieves its significance.” Although 
Roosa’s observations came in the midst of the debate over whether monetary 
policy  effectiveness  after  the  impending  Federal  Reserve-Treasury  Accord 
would necessitate large swings in open-market interest rates, the importance 
of bank credit continued to be a hotly debated topic long after the accord was 
signed. 
Over the next dozen years the argument was refined, and a number of investi- 
gators, notably, Tobin and Brainard  (1  963), Brunner and Meltzer (1963), and 
Brainard (1964), proposed models that included as a central feature the imper- 
fect substitutability of  various assets including bank loans. Thus, Modigliani 
(1963) was able to more precisely summarize the role of banks in a world of 
imperfect information: “Suppose the task of making credit available to units 
in  need  of  financing  requires  specialized  knowledge  and  organization  and 
is therefore carried out exclusively by specialized institutions which we may 
label financial intermediaries.. . . Intermediaries in turn lend to final debtors 
of the economy at some rate . . . [which] adjusts at best only slowly to market 225  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
conditions.. . . The single rate of  the perfect market model is replaced by  a 
plurality of rates.” 
Despite the fact that the Modigliani rendition  of  the lending view is very 
close to the one we are now advocating, the lending view began to fall out of 
favor during the 1960s. In part, this lack of acceptance seems attributable to the 
fact that many early accounts relied heavily (and unnecessarily, in our view) 
on a credit-rationing mechanism, while at the same time failing to provide a 
satisfying theoretical role for such rationing to exist. For example, Samuelson 
rebutted Roosa by arguing that the credit rationing implicit in the availability 
doctrine was at odds with profit maximization by  lenders (see testimony  of 
Samuelson in U.S.  Congress 1952). More importantly, as Gertler (1988) points 
out, the Modigliani and Miller results on the irrelevance  of  capital structure 
seemed to undermine the basic premise that lending arrangements could be 
important. Furthermore, on the empirical front, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
were supplying strong evidence in favor of the money view. 
As we will discuss in the remainder of the paper, each of these objections 
has  subsequently been  addressed. For instance, work by  Jaffee and Russell 
(1976),  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981),  and  many  others has  demonstrated  that 
credit rationing can occur in models where all agents are maximizing.2 More 
generally, as we argue in the next  section, research  in the theory  of credit- 
market imperfections and financial intermediation has helped put the lending 
view on much firmer microfoundations. Still, the failure of the lending view 
to be widely embraced cannot be completely ascribed to theoretical discom- 
fort-it  has also suffered until recently from a lack of clear-cut, direct empiri- 
cal support. Thus, perhaps even more so than the theoretical developments, the 
recent empirical work reviewed in section 7.3 has helped to renew interest in 
the lending view. 
7.2  Building Blocks of the Lending View 
Perhaps the best-known recent formulation of the lending view is a model 
due to Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Their model makes it clear that there are 
three necessary  conditions that must hold if there is to be a distinct lending 
channel of monetary policy transmission: 
1. Intermediated loans and open-market bonds must not be perfect substi- 
tutes for some firms on the liability side of their balance sheet. In other words, 
the  Modigliani-Miller  capital-structure  invariance  proposition  must  break 
down in a particular way, so that these firms are unable to offset a decline in 
the supply of  loans simply by borrowing  more directly from the household 
sector in public markets. 
1, See also Tobin and Brainard (1  963) and Brainard (1964) for early general equilibrium models 
2. Indeed, Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Fuerst (1992b) outline models of monetary policy 
of financial intermediation with imperfect substitutability across assets. 
transmission that capture the credit-rationing aspects of  Roosa’s ( 195  I) availability doctrine. 226  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
2. By changing the quantity of reserves available to the banking system, the 
Federal Reserve must be able to affect the supply of intermediated loans. That 
is, the intermediary sector as a whole must not be able to completely insulate 
its lending activities from shocks to reserves, either by switching from deposits 
to less reserve-intensive forms of finance (for example, certificates of deposit 
[CDs], commercial paper, equity, etc.) or by paring its net holdings of bonds. 
3. There must be  some form of imperfect price adjustment that  prevents 
any monetary policy shock from being neutral. If prices adjust frictionlessly, a 
change in nominal reserves will be met with an equiproportionate change in 
prices, and both bank and corporate balance sheets will remain unaltered in 
real terms. In this case, there can be no real effects of monetary policy through 
either the lending channel or the conventional money channel. 
If either of the first two necessary conditions fails to hold, loans and bonds 
effectively  become perfect substitutes, and we are reduced back to the pure 
money view of policy transmission. If condition I fails, Modigliani-Miller cor- 
porations will completely arbitrage away any cost differentials between loans 
and bonds. If condition 2 fails, intermediaries will do the arbitrage. In either 
case, the net result will be that loans and bonds will always be priced identi- 
cally in equilibrium. 
Although  the Bernanke-Blinder  formulation is vcry helpful in illustrating 
the necessary conditions that are required for the existence of a distinct lending 
channel, it does not directly address whether each of these three conditions can 
be given  solid microfoundations. Nor does it ask whether any  such micro- 
foundations  appear plausible  given  the  current  financial  environment.  For 
example: what sort of  technological and/or  informational assumptions must 
one make about the structure of  intermediation to generate condition 2? Do 
these assumptions seem reasonable in light of what we actually observe? 
In the rest of this section, we take up these questions relating to microfound- 
ations. To preview the discussion a bit: We begin by arguing that condition  1 
is probably easiest to justify, both in the context of  a widely accepted, well- 
articulated theoretical paradigm, and in terms of what is observed in practice. 
On the other hand, condition 2 is quite a bit trickier-there  are a number of 
possible factors that could conceivably limit the Fed’s ability to affect the sup- 
ply of intermediated loans. Our bottom line here is that it is nonetheless highly 
unlikely that condition 2 will fail to hold completely, although one can imagine 
circumstances in which Fed policy might have only a small impact on aggre- 
gate loan supply. 
Finally,  the  question  of  the  microfoundations  for  condition  3  is  much 
broader in scope than just the lending channel-this  question is central to any 
account of monetary policy, and has accordingly received an enormous amount 
of attention. Thus we do not  attempt a detailed treatment  here. Instead, we 
focus on a much narrower issue: the interaction between the microfoundations 
for condition 3 and those for conditions  1 and 2. In particular, we focus on a 
class of models-those  of the dynamic equilibriudcash-in-advance variety- 227  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
where the frictions driving imperfect price adjustment can be one and the same 
as those driving intermediary lending policy. We  ask whether these sorts of 
models are likely to be successful in providing a realistic account of both price 
adjustment and intermediary lending patterns. 
7.2.1  Why Do Some Firms “Depend” on Intermediated Loans? 
In the last decade or so, a large body of theoretical literature has developed 
on the subject of financial intermediation. One broad theme of this work (seen, 
for example, in Diamond  1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986; and Fama 1990) is 
that intermediaries can represent efficient vehicles for conserving on the costs 
of monitoring certain types of borrowers. The basic idea is this: Due to asym- 
metric information and/or moral hazard, lending without any monitoring can 
involve large deadweight costs. Given these costs, it would be efficient to de- 
vote some resources to monitoring activities. However, if there are a large num- 
ber of lenders-that  is, if the credit is extended in public markets-free-rider 
problems will confound attempts to monitor. Thus it can make sense to create 
an  intermediary  to  serve as  a  single  “delegated  monitor,” thereby  circum- 
venting  these  free-rider  problems  and conserving  on aggregate  monitoring 
costs. 
While ultimately correct, this argument is, by itself, incomplete. Although 
having a single intermediary do all the monitoring would seem to represent an 
obvious cost savings, there is a potential difficulty, namely, the introduction of 
a second layer of agency. This point is addressed by Diamond (1984), who 
asks the critical question:  “Who monitors  the  delegated monitor?’  In other 
words, what is to prevent the intermediary from taking investors’ money and 
squandering it by making bad loans (that is, by lending without going to the 
effort of actually doing any monitoring)? Diamond shows that this second-tier 
agency problem can be mitigated if the intermediary holds a large, diversified 
portfolio of loans, and finances itself largely with publicly issued debt. 
Diamond’s conclusions about the optimal capital structure for an intermedi- 
ary raise an issue that is central for monetary policy. Although Diamond argues 
that intermediaries ought to be largely debt-financed, there is nothing in his 
model-or  in many of the other models of financial intermediation-that  sug- 
gests that intermediaries must be financed with demand deposits. Indeed, the 
institutions in many of these models can equally well be thought of as “non- 
bank banks,” that is, finance companies such as G.E. Capital that makes loans 
but do not finance themselves at all with deposits. 
Thus while it seems relatively straightforward to argue from first principles 
that some firms-particularly  those for whom monitoring costs are likely to 
be high-will  be to some degree intermediary  dependent, it is less obvious 
that they will necessarily be bank dependent, in the sense of relying on institu- 
tions that themselves are financed with demand deposits. In terms of the neces- 
sary conditions we have defined  above, this distinction implies some initial 
doubts about whether one should expect condition 2 to hold  across a wide 228  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
range of  circumstances. If intermediation can just as easily be done through 
institutions that fund themselves with nonreservable forms of finance (for ex- 
ample, commercial paper, long-term debt, etc.), then it is unclear how the Fed- 
eral Reserve  could ever affect the aggregate supply of intermediated  loans. 
This question will be taken up in detail in section 7.2.2 below; for the moment 
we will put aside the important distinction between deposit-taking banks and 
intermediaries more generally. 
In addition to the theoretical work, there have recently been  a number of 
empirical papers that support the notion that intermediated loans are “special” 
for some borrowers. First, Fama (1985) and James (1987) show that bank bor- 
rowers effectively bear the cost of reserve requirements, which suggests that 
they are getting a service which cannot be replicated by nonbank providers of 
finance, such as the public markets. Second, James (1987) and Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) find that bank loans agreements are taken as “good news” 
by the stock market, consistent with the notion that banks provide an informa- 
tion-gathering function. Finally, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (199  l)  show 
that Japanese firms with close banking relationships are less likely to be liquid- 
ity constrained. This finding fits with the argument that monitoring by interme- 
diaries reduces the information and/or incentive problems that typically create 
a wedge between the costs of internal and external finance. 
It is one thing to believe that certain firms will be dependent on the services 
of the intermediary sector. It is quite another to believe that firms may come to 
rely on a particular intermediary with whom they have an established relation- 
ship-in  other words, that there are lock-in effects that make it costly to switch 
lenders.  However, as we argue below, if lender-specific lock-in does indeed 
exist,  it can have important consequences  for the transmission of monetary 
policy-all  else equal,  such lock-in will  tend  to make the  lending channel 
more potent. 
A few recent papers, both theoretical and empirical, provide some support 
for the hypothesis that banking relationships involve a degree of  lock-in. On 
the theoretical side, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that the very fact 
that a bank does monitoring creates the potential for lock-in. In the course of 
a relationship, a bank will acquire an informational monopoly with respect to 
its client, a monopoly which puts other potential lenders at a comparative dis- 
advantage. 
On the empirical  side, Sushka, Slovin, and Polonchek  (1993) conduct an 
interesting  event  study  of  Continental  Bank’s customers  during  the  period 
when Continental was in danger of failing and was ultimately bailed out by the 
government. During this time, their customers’ stock prices moved in concert 
with Continental’s own fortunes, falling with bad news about Continental, and 
rising sharply with the announcement of the bailout. This suggests that these 
customers were somewhat locked in to Continental, and could not costlessly 
switch to another lender. Further evidence for the importance of banking rela- 
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of  credit to a small business is, all else equal, an increasing function of  the 
length of its relationship with its bank. 
Of  course, even if one accepts that condition  1 is both  theoretically  and 
empirically plausible, there remains the question of its aggregate importance, 
not only today, but looking into the future. Certainly there are a substantial 
number of U.S. firms that cannot be considered intermediary dependent in any 
sense. Moreover, the evidence from the United States as well as other countries 
suggest that there is a strong secular trend away from intermediated finance, 
and toward securities markets. 
In spite of  such trends, the data show that intermediaries-and  banks in 
particular-continue  to play a dominant role in financing U.S. corporations, 
particularly medium-sized and smaller ones. (We review some evidence to this 
effect below.) Thus it seems reasonable to believe that shocks to the supply 
of  intermediated loans might have important aggregate implications, even in 
today’s environment. 
7.2.2  Can the Fed Affect the Supply of Intermediated Loans? 
The second necessary condition for the existence of a distinct lending chan- 
nel is that the Fed be able to affect-by  manipulating the amount of reserves 
available to the banking sector-the  aggregate supply of loans made by inter- 
mediaries. We  examine four factors that could conceivably  weaken  or even 
break the link between reserves and loan supply: (a)  the existence of nonbank 
intermediaries; (b)  banks’ ability to react to changes in reserves by adjusting 
their holdings of securities rather than loans; (c)  banks’ ability to raise funds 
with nonreservable forms of financing; and (d) the existence of risk-based capi- 
tal requirements. 
The Signi$cance  of Nonbank Intermediaries 
As noted  above, many theories of financial intermediation leave open the 
possibility that lending to ‘‘infomation-intensive’’ borrowers could be accom- 
plished by nondeposit-taking institutions. If such institutions play an important 
role, the link between Fed policy and aggregate loan supply might be weak- 
ened, or even severed. First, and most obviously, if nonbank intermediaries are 
responsible for most of the lending volume in the economy, the Fed will be 
unable to have much of an impact on the overall supply of intermediated loans, 
even if it can influence bank loan supply. 
Second, and more subtly, one might argue that even if nonbank intermediar- 
ies do not have a large market share, they may effectively be the “marginal” 
lenders in the economy-that  is, they may be able to pick up much of the slack 
if bank loan supply is cut back. However, we view this marginal lender argu- 
ment as not completely compelling, particularly with regard  to its short-run 
implications.  It  implicitly  assumes  that  there  are negligible  costs incurred 
when borrowers switch from one lender to another. As seen in the previous 
section, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that such 230  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
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Fig. 7.1  Composition of Credit (nonfinancial corporations) 
an assumption is inappropriate-that  there is indeed a significant degree of 
lock-in between specific banks and their customers. 
Thus if one is interested in understanding relatively short-run behavior, there 
may be something useful to be learned from comparing the relative sizes of 
the bank and nonbank intermediary sectors. 
Figure 7.1 addresses this question, showing how the composition of  inter- 
mediated loans to nonfinancial corporations breaks down into bank Commer- 
cial and Industrial loans (C and I loans) and finance-company loans over the 
period 1977-91.  In addition, the figure also sheds some light on the issue raised 
above-the  substitution of open-market borrowings for intermediated loans- 
by  including data on the growth of  the commercial paper market over this 
period. 
The figure illustrates that while both finance-company loans and commer- 
cial paper have grown very rapidly in percentage terms over the last fifteen 
years, traditional commercial banks are still by far the most important of these 
three sources of finance, representing over 68 percent of the combined total in 
1991. (The share was on the order of 78 percent in  1977). Thus it would be 
premature to say that growth in either the commercial paper market or in the 
nonbank intermediary sector has rendered the commercial banking sector of 
significantly less aggregate importance than it was, say, a couple of  decades 
ago. 
Table  7.1 presents more detail on how  corporate financing patterns have 
evolved over the last twenty or so years. Using data from the Quarterly Finan- 231  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
Table 7.1  Bank and Nonbank Sources of Debt for Manufacturing Corporations, 
1973,1991 
1973:4  1991:4 
Total  Large  Medium  Small  Total  Large  Medium  Small 
Bank debflotal debt 
Short-term  78.8%  64.9%  93.1%  84.0%  44.9%  22.8%  77.0%  82.9% 
Long-term  24.6%  17.1%  36.1%  43.3%  31.2%  21.1%  51.7%  59.3% 
Total  34.4%  23.4%  49.8%  55.3%  33.0%  21.3%  54.9%  65.5% 
Commercial paper as % of 
Short-term debt  12.7%  26.1%  2.1%  1.7%  N.A.  62.8%  6.9%  N.A. 
Nonbank short-term 
debt  59.7%  74.3%  31.0%  10.4%  N.A.  81.3%  30.1%  N.A. 
Total debt  2.3%  3.4%  0.5%  0.5%  N.A.  7.5%  0.9%  N.A. 
Total nonbankdebt  3.5%  4.5%  1.0%  1.1%  N.A.  9.6%  1.9%  N.A. 
Source: Quarterly Financial Report 
Note: In  1991:4, Small was under $25 million (20.6 percent of  total manufacturing assets), Medium was 
$25 million-$1  billion (7.9 percent), and Large was above $1 billion in assets (71.4 percent). In 1973:4, 
Small was under $5 million (10.4  percent of total), Medium was $5-250  million (22.7 percent), and Large 
was above $250 million (66.9 percent). N.A.  = not available. 
cia1 Report, we break down manufacturing firms into three size categories- 
small, medium, and large-and  look at how the balance sheets of firms in each 
category have changed between 1973 and 1991. 
Again, the most striking finding is that if we take the overall manufacturing- 
wide ratio of bank debt to total debt, there is virtually no change over time. 
Bank debt represents 34.4 percent of total debt in  1973, and 33.0 percent in 
1991.  This aggregate number reinforces the conclusion drawn above-that  one 
should not exaggerate the extent to which changes in financing practices have 
diminished the role of banks. 
Of  course, banks have  lost substantial ground in some areas. First, if  one 
focuses only on short-term lending, banks have  seen their overall share fall 
from 78.8 percent to 44.9 percent. (This is offset by the fact that banks have 
actually gained share in overall long-term lending.) Moreover, this  loss of 
short-term market share is almost exclusively concentrated among large corpo- 
rations-the  one place where the commercial paper market has made very 
substantial  inroad^.^ Short-term bank loans as a fraction of all short-term debt 
of  large manufacturing corporations fell from 64.9 percent in  1973 to 22.8 
percent in 199  1. 
3. These figures may somewhat overstate the true economic extent of disintermediation, as ap- 
proximately 8 percent of  commercial paper issues are backed by  irrevocable standby letters of 
credit from banks (see Gorton and Pennacchi 1990). In such cases, banks still bear the full credit 
risk, and presumably engage in monitoring. More generally, a number of other financial innova- 
tions-for  example, the loan  sales market-have  blurred  the  line between  intermediated  and 
public-market sources of finance. 232  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
While the gains of the commercial paper market among large borrowers are 
certainly impressive, their aggregate impact should not be overstated.  Com- 
mercial paper has not yet penetrated the medium- and small-firm categories to 
any perceptible degree, and banks’ share of short-term debt for these firms is 
still overwhelming, at 77.0 percent and 82.9 percent, respectively. 
The Future of  Nonbank Intermediaries 
Looking to the future, the rise of  nonbank  intermediaries documented  in 
figure 7.1 raises a number of difficult questions. At one extreme, some observ- 
ers-particularly  advocates of  “narrow banking”-have  concluded that there 
is no longer any reason (other than perhaps historical  accident or bad regula- 
tion),  to  glue  together  in  a  single  institution  the  deposit-taking  and  loan- 
making functions,  as opposed  to their being carried  out separately, say, by 
money  market mutual funds and finance companies,  respectively. What ex- 
actly, ask these observers, are the synergies between deposit taking and loan 
making? If no clear-cut synergies can be identified, one might expect the non- 
bank sector to grow rapidly in the future, thereby diluting the potency of any 
lending channel of policy transmission. (See Gorton and Pennacchi 1990 for a 
forceful rendition of this argument.) 
The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides something of a counter- 
point  to  the  Gorton-Pennacchi  argument.  The  Diamond-Dybvig  model 
suggests that there may indeed be a link between the deposit-taking and loan- 
making functions of banks. In their model, banks perform a “liquidity transfor- 
mation” role.  All  individual investors  would  like  to invest in highly liquid 
assets, because they may suddenly wish to consume all of their wealth. But the 
economy’s productive investment opportunities require tying up resources in 
long-lived projects. In this setting, it is optimal for a bank to issue demand 
deposits-thereby  satisfying individuals’ liquidity needs-and  to invest the 
proceeds in the long-lived  asset^.^ 
Thus a synergy between deposit taking and loan making arises out of a fun- 
damental mismatch between individuals’ desire to hold liquid assets and the 
economy’s need to invest in illiquid projects. However, the Diamond-Dybvig 
model probably overstates the importance of the liquidity transformation syn- 
ergy, since it simply assumes that all investment opportunities are long-term 
and all savers want to keep all their wealth in liquid assets. In reality, there may 
not be nearly as much of a mismatch between savers’ portfolio preferences and 
the underlying investment  technology-there  will  be both  some investment 
opportunities that  are relatively  short-term, and some investors who are not 
unwilling to tie up their assets for a longer period of time. Gorton and Pennac- 
chi present some evidence that bears on this point. One fact they emphasize is 
4. Diamond and Dybvig show that, in this setting, bank deposits perform a role that cannot be 
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that the sum of outstanding Treasury bills and nonfinancial commercial paper 
is now roughly twice as large as the level of checkable bank deposits. This is 
a recent development-bank  deposits were larger until around 1980-and  it 
suggests that it might soon be possible to have a world in which deposit taking 
is done largely by  institutions (like money market mutual funds) that invest 
primarily in  high-quality, short-term liquid assets. Inevitably, however, these 
sorts of thought exercises run into difficult general equilibrium considerations. 
As Gorton and Pennacchi themselves point out, simply showing that the vol- 
ume of T-bills and commercial paper greatly exceeds bank deposits is not con- 
clusive proof that there is no role in equilibrium for traditional “liquidity trans- 
forming”  banks  in  the  Diamond-Dybvig  spirit.  After  all,  T-bills  and 
commercial paper outside the deposit-taking system may already be satisfying 
some of the economy’s demand for liquidity, so it would be wrong to posit that 
one could take them and use them as backing for deposits without losing any- 
thing. 
Our own view is that while the Gorton-Pennacchi argument has a great deal 
of merit, it is hard to predict with any confidence that we will soon see anything 
like a disappearance of  traditional dual-function commercial banks. Perhaps 
the greatest uncertainties have  to do not  with  the economic considerations 
sketched above, but with regulation. Even if one completely accepts the hy- 
pothesis that there are no real economic synergies holding deposit taking and 
loan making together, government regulations can provide a powerful glue. For 
example, deposit-insurance subsidies may be effectively larger for those banks 
that invest in risky loans rather than T-bills, thereby encouraging a combination 
of the two activities. 
In this regard, one important regulatory innovation is the introduction of 
risk-based capital requirements. As we discuss below, these may have the ef- 
fect of accelerating any natural separation of deposit taking and loan making. 
Banks’ Holdings of Securities as a BufSer against Reserve Shocks 
Even ignoring the issues raised by the existence of nonbank intermediaries, 
it is still possible that bank lending might be decoupled from open-market 
operations. Suppose that as a result of  a monetary tightening, a bank finds 
that its deposits have been reduced by one dollar. How will the bank respond? 
Basically, it can adjust along one of three dimensions: (a)  it can cut back on 
the number of loans it makes; (b)  it can sell some of its securities holdings (for 
example, T-bills); or (c) it can attempt to raise more nondeposit financing 
(for example, CDs, medium-term notes, long-term debt, or equity). In order 
for condition 2 to be satisfied, it must be that the bank wishes (for a given 
configuration of rates on the different instruments) to do some of the adjust- 
ment by  reducing loans. Or said differently, it must be that the bank is not 
wholly indifferent to variations in the quantity of T-bills andor CDs, and thus 
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monetary shocks. (Note that selling T-bills and issuing CDs are closely related 
strategies-either  can be  thought of  as reducing  the bank’s  net  holding  of 
“bonds,” broadly defined.) 
Why might a bank not be indifferent to variations in T-bills or CDs? We will 
start with T-bills. The argument here is straightforward, and has been made by 
many authors. (See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler 1987.)  At any point in 
time, a bank faces the possibility of random depositor withdrawals. If the bank 
holds all its assets (other than required reserves) in illiquid loans, it will have 
a difficult time accommodating these withdrawals while still meeting reserve 
requirements. In particular, it will be forced to liquidate loans on short notice, 
which could be very costly. By holding easily marketable securities such as T- 
bills, the bank avoids these illiquidity costs. 
Of course, there is a trade-off involved in holding T-bills, since they offer a 
lower return than intermediated loans. This suggests that for any given level of 
deposits, and any given configuration of interest rates on loans and bills, there 
will be a unique optimal quantity of bill holdings. In other words, banks will 
not be indifferent to the amount of T-bills they hold.5 
Table 7.2 presents some data on banks’ holdings of  securities, taken from 
the Call Reports. The data show that there are persistent cross-sectional differ- 
ences in banks’ portfolio composition. In particular, large banks-those  in the 
top  1 percent as measured by total assets-hold  significantly less in the way 
of  securities than do medium-sized banks, who in turn hold less than  small 
banks. These well-defined  cross-sectional patterns  would be very unlikely if 
portfolio composition was a matter of indifference to banks. In contrast, they 
are exactly what one might expect if banks traded off the liquidity of securities 
against their lower returns: smaller banks, with fewer depositors, are more vul- 
nerable to large (percentage) withdrawals, and hence must protect themselves 
by holding more securities6 
Banks’ Ability to Make Use oj  Nonreservable Forms of Finance 
We now turn to the question of why a bank does not offset a loss in deposits 
solely by issuing more CDs-that  is, why it is not indifferent to variations in 
the quantity of CDs it has outstanding. Romer and Romer (1990) argue that 
banks are likely  to be indifferent, which would mean  that condition 2  fails 
to hold. 
However, the Romer-Romer argument embodies a highly simplified view of 
the CD market. Implicitly, it assumes that the supply of CDs available to any 
bank is perfectly elastic at the current market rate-that  is, a bank can issue 
5.  See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1992) for an extension of these arguments and a general analysis 
of the consequences of risk aversion by banks. 
6. Another reason one might expect small banks to hold more securities is if information prob- 
lems made it more difficult for them to raise nondeposit external finance on short notice. See the 
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Table 7.2  Median Securities-to-Assets Ratios, for Banks in Different Size 
Classes, 1976-1990 
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Source: Call Reports. 
as many CDs as it wants without paying any premium. There are a number of 
reasons why this is unlikely to be true in practice. 
Given that large-denomination CDs (or other instruments that a bank might 
use to finance itself in the public capital markets, such as medium-term notes, 
long-term debt, or equity) are not federally insured, investors must concern 
themselves with the quality of  the issuing bank. If  there is some degree of 
asymmetric information between the bank and investors, the standard sorts of 
adverse selection problems (see, for example, Myers and Majluf  1984) will 
arise. These considerations will tend to make the marginal cost of  external 
financing an increasing function of the amount raised.’ 
All the available evidence supports the notion that default risk is important 
in the pricing of wholesale CDs. Large banks’ CDs are evaluated by five rating 
agencies, and the rates paid by different quality issuers can vary considerably. 
Moreover, there is considerable intertemporal variation in the spread between 
average marketwide CD rates and the rate on riskless T-bills. To take just one 
example, the troubles of Continental Illinois in 1984 led to widespread worries 
about bank health, and an increase in this spread from 40 basis points in April 
to nearly 150 basis points in July.* 
The implications of increasing marginal costs of CD financing can be illus- 
trated with a very simple partial-equilibrium model. (The model also captures 
the earlier argument that banks need to hold some securities for liquidity pur- 
7. See Lucas and McDonald (1992) for a recent model of  the banking sector in which adverse 
selection problems interfere with banks’ ability to raise nondeposit external finance. 
8. See Cook and Rowe (1986).  Fama (1985) documents that CD rates move very closely with 
commercial paper rates. Indeed, both appear to rise relative to T-bill rates during times of tight 
monetary policy (Stigum 1990). In the case of  CDs, one possible interpretation is that banks at- 
tempt to issue more CDs as a substitute for deposits during periods of tight money, and that this 
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poses.) Consider a representative bank that holds as assets reserves (R),  loans 
(L),  and bonds  (B),  and finances itself  with deposits (D)  and CDs (C). The 
bank seeks to maximize 
(1)  Max rLL + rp  -  rcC, 
where r,,r,,  and rc represent the interest rates on loans, bonds, and CDs, re- 
spectively. (This formulation assumes that demand deposits are non-interest 
bearing.) The bank is a price taker with respect to the first two rates, but per- 
ceives rc to be an increasing function of C. The bank faces the following con- 
straints: 
(2)  R 2  kD (reserve requirement) 
(3)  R + B 2  jD  (liquidity constraint) 
(4)  R + L + B = C  + D (assets = liabilities) 
Inequality (2)  implicitly assumes that CDs are not subject to any reserve 
requirement, but it is easy to generalize the argument to the case where they 
are just subject to a lower requirement than deposits. Inequality (3) is meant 
to capture in as simple a fashion as possible the sorts of liquidity  arguments 
for holding bonds made in the previous section. To justify it, one might imag- 
ine that a fraction j  of  the bank’s deposits may be redeemed at any point in 
time, and that it is prohibitively costly to liquidate loans immediately. Thus the 
bank must hold enough bonds so that the sum of bonds and reserves is suffi- 
cient to meet  redemption^.^ Clearly, one can develop a somewhat more sophis- 
ticated version of this story if one is interested in making the portfolio demand 
for bonds less degenerate. 
So long as r, < r,, all three constraints will be met with equality, and the 
bank’s first order condition is given by 
If, as assumed by Romer and Romer, there are no increasing marginal costs 
of  CD financing, then the loan rate must be exactly equal to the CD rate in 
equilibrium-in  other  words,  loans  and  CDs  (or,  alternatively,  loans  and 
bonds) are perfect substitutes from the perspective of the banking sector, and 
condition 2 fails. 
Things are very different when banks perceive increasing costs of CD issu- 
ance. Now, if the spread between loan and CD rates remains unchanged, then 
the quantity of  CDs is pinned down. Thus the “first-round”  response of the 
banking sector to a one-dollar decrease in reserves is to decrease deposits by 
Ilk, bonds by  (jlk - l), and loans by (1  -j)/k,  while leaving CDs fixed. Of 
course, in general equilibrium, these effects may be attenuated, as the spread 
9. Rernanke and Gertler (1987) derive something very similar to our liquidity constraint in the 
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between loan rates and CD rates may widen, thereby encouraging more CD 
issuance. But in any case, loans and CDs are no longer perfect substitutes, and 
the spread between them will be affected by shocks to reserves.’” 
The Impact of  Risk-Based Capital Requirements 
We argued above that a bank’s asset mix of loans and securities was likely 
to represent an interior optimum of a portfolio choice problem. The important 
implication that follows from this is that the bank will not want to do all of the 
adjustment to a contractionary shock by selling securities-in  order to pre- 
serve optimality, it will also wish to decrease its holdings of loans. However, 
there is an important caveat to this argument. Risk-based capital requirements 
(of the sort that have been phased in over the last several years under the Basle 
Accords) can tie a bank’s ability to extend loans to its level of equity capital. 
If  a bank’s lending is constrained by  such regulation, then it may do all of its 
marginal adjustments by buying and selling securities. 
This can be easily illustrated in the context of  the model sketched above. 
Risk-based capital requirements essentially impose an additional constraint of 
the form 
(6)  pL 5  E, 
where p is the capital requirement on loans, and E is the bank’s equity. This 
simple version of the constraint implicitly (and realistically) assumes that T- 
bills are not subject to any capital requirement. 
If it is costly for a bank to adjust the amount of equity financing it has (say 
because of the information problems that accompany new equity issues-see 
Myers and Majluf  1984), then (6) may bind. It is easy to see that in this case, 
the liquidity constraint in (3) will be slack-that  is, the bank will hold more 
bonds than it needs for liquidity purposes. This is simply because it does not 
have enough capital to support more of the higher-yielding loans. Under these 
circumstances, monetary policy will have no effect on the bank’s desire to in- 
vest in loans. Loans are tied down by (6), and all marginal changes in the 
bank’s portfolio are accomplished by buying and selling T-bills. (See Bernanke 
and Lown 1991 for empirical evidence that bank capital can be a constraining 
factor in lending behavior.) 
Of course, it is highly unlikely that all or even most banks will face binding 
capital  constraints at any point  in  time.  What is the effect  of  such uncon- 
strained banks? At one extreme, it might be argued that as long as there are any 
capital-unconstrained banks, they will effectively be the “marginal” lenders in 
the economy,  and hence the  banking sector as a whole will behave as if  it 
were capital-unconstrained. However, such an argument runs into the sorts of 
10. The magnitude of the ultimate general equilibrium effect will depend on the magnitude of 
r<’.  If rc’  is very small, loan rates will rise only slightly relative to CD rates, and a large volume of 
new CD issuance will take place. Converqely, if i-,‘  is large, loan rates will rise by relatively more, 
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problems raised earlier-it  implicitly disregards the potential for switching 
costs when borrowers attempt to move from one bank to another. Our view is 
that even if just a fraction of the banks in the economy are capital-constrained, 
this will affect the potency of monetary policy. Essentially, we are saying that 
if Bank A is capital constrained, then Fed easing will not have the same expan- 
sionary effects it otherwise might, because Bank A will not lend any more than 
it already is, and because Bank A's  customers cannot frictionlessly switch to 
another unconstrained bank that is easing its lending policy. 
This sort of logic may help to explain why monetary policy was thought by 
many to be relatively inef€ectual during the 1990-91  recession. To the extent 
that many (though certainly not all) banks found their capital positions im- 
paired by large losses on their existing loan portfolios, and hence found (6) to 
be binding, the lending channel of monetary transmission would be weakened. 
More subtly, if  regional shocks were in part responsible for the loan  losses, 
then monetary policy might have a more powerful effect in some parts of the 
country-those  less hard hit by the adverse shocks-than  in others. 
Similar reasoning also suggests that accounting and regulatory decisions can 
have  important effects on the potency of  monetary policy. If  regulators are 
more aggressive in forcing banks to acknowledge loan losses, this will tend to 
reduce bank capital, and again dilute the effectiveness of the lending channel. 
Conversely, if  capital requirements are relaxed, monetary  policy  might  be 
made somewhat more potent. 
Looking to the future, risk-based capital requirements may also play a sig- 
nificant role in the evolution of the banking system. We  noted earlier that an 
important open question for monetary policy is the extent to which deposit 
taking and loan making will tend to grow apart in the years to come. Risk- 
based capital requirements would seem to have the potential to accelerate any 
natural separation of  the two activities. In the past, there was  a regulation- 
induced reason to keep the two together-by  taking deposits and making risky 
loans, a bank could raise the value of the subsidy it received from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Risk-based capital requirements re- 
duce this incentive, as would risk-based insurance premiums. 
7.2.3  Imperfect Price Adjustment and the Lending View 
As noted earlier, the requirement of imperfect price adjustment is not unique 
to the lending view-it  is a prerequisite for any theory in which monetary 
policy has real effects. Accordingly, we do not attempt to survey the enormous 
literature on the microfoundations of imperfect price adjustment. Rather, we 
focus on a much narrower issue: the extent to which the frictions responsible 
for imperfect price adjustment might interact with those responsible for condi- 
tions 1 and 2. 
The Bernanke-Blinder formulation of the lending view, like traditional IS- 
LM models, implicitly assumes that prices are sticky, without providing any 
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price assumption is completely separated from the assumptions driving firms’ 
and intermediaries’ preferences across loans and bonds-one  can imagine var- 
ying the horizon over which prices adjust without modifying the rest of  the 
model in any substantive way. 
As we have already emphasized, however, the essence of the lending view 
can probably be captured in a wide range of  models. For example, if one is 
uncomfortable with  simply assuming that prices are temporarily fixed, one 
might appeal to the type of  “limited participation” dynamic general equilib- 
rium models introduced by Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984) 
to generate imperfect price adjustment, while still preserving the other neces- 
sary building blocks for the lending view.“ 
Although we are not aware of any limited participation models that explic- 
itly set out to capture the distinction between the money and lending channels, 
there are a couple that seem to be quite close to addressing it. Two  recent 
papers by  Fuerst (1992a, 1992b) are especially relevant. In both papers the 
monetary  mechanism works  roughly  as  follows: There  are  “households,” 
“firms,” and “intermediaries.” Both households and firms are subject to cash- 
in-advance constraints in all of their transactions. 
A monetary shock takes the form of the central bank injecting cash directly 
into the intermediary sector. The important distinction between households 
and firms is that firms are “closer” to the intermediary sector, in the sense 
that they can transact with intermediaries without any time lag. Households, in 
contrast, must wait a period to revise their investment decisions. This implies 
that the immediate consequence of a monetary injection is that the firms wind 
up holding all the extra cash for one period. In other words, the firms are the 
only participants in this limited participation model, and monetary injections 
are funneled to them via the banking sector. 
Monetary policy is nonneutral in this setting (thanks to the limited participa- 
tion feature), and it has compositional effects. The interest rate in the firm 
lending market will be lower after a positive monetary shock than the (shadow) 
interest rate in the household market, since the firms absorb all of the shock in 
the short term. In one version of  the model (Fuerst 1992a), the interest rate 
clears the firm lending market; in the other there is some degree of  credit 
rationing. 
Although Fuerst does not suggest that these models bear specifically on the 
lending channel, it seems to us that with a bit of reinterpretation, they might be 
thought of in this way. Suppose we relabel Fuerst’s “firms” as “bank-dependent 
firms,” and his “households” as “non-bank-dependent firms.” The model would 
now have very much the feeling of the lending view. In particular, the effects 
of monetary policy would be transmitted via bank lending policy, and these 
effects would fall more heavily on the shoulders of bank-dependent firms. 
11. We  are unaware of  any empirical evidence that supports the limited-participation assump- 
tion. Thus,  both the IS-LM and limited-participation models can be criticized for the mechanisms 
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It is interesting to see where our necessary conditions (1, 2, and 3)  would 
show up in such a model. It turns out that all three are actually embedded in a 
single timing assumption-namely,  that only bank-dependent firms and inter- 
mediaries can transact with each other without any lag. First, note that since 
bank-dependent  and non-bank-dependent  firms are effectively  “walled  off” 
from  each other in the short run, they cannot arbitrage away  differences in 
borrowing costs. This is condition  1. Second, intermediaries are also walled 
off from non-bank-dependent firms in the short run. Thus they can only unload 
a central-bank injection on bank-dependent  firms, and they too cannot arbi- 
trage away differences in borrowing costs across the bank-dependent and non- 
bank-dependent  markets.  So condition 2 is satisfied. Finally, as we have al- 
ready seen, the limited participation feature also generates the imperfect price 
adjustment required in condition 3. 
In one sense, such a formulation of the lending view is quite elegant, since 
it traces everything back to a single friction-the  (exogenous) cost that pre- 
vents non-bank-dependent  firms from participating continuously in the bank 
lending market. However, this compact elegance may come at a cost in terms 
of empirical realism. For example, banks’ portfolio “preferences” in this sort 
of model are purely a short-run phenomenon-in  the short run, banks have no 
choice other than  to funnel all of  an injection to a subset of  firms, but this 
changes completely  once a “period”  elapses. This implies that  if  monetary 
policy is ever going to impact the volume of bank lending, we should see these 
effects unfold very quickly. As will be shown in section 7.3 below, this implica- 
tion runs counter to what is seen in the data. 
In contrast, in the Bernanke-Blinder  formulation  of the lending channel, 
banks (and firms) are assumed to have well-defined lung-run portfolio prefer- 
ences between loans and bonds. This formulation therefore does not carry with 
it the strong implication that any of the changes in bank-lending volume that 
accompany a monetary policy shock should be manifested immediately. Thus 
on this score at least, it does a better job of fitting the facts. 
We do not at all mean to suggest that the limited participatioddynamic equi- 
librium class of models will ultimately be unable to capture the salient aspects 
of the lending view. Rather, we are simply pointing out that there may be some 
problems in interpreting current versions of these models as providing an accu- 
rate and complete description of  the lending view, even if they capture some 
of its basic essence. Richer formulations, which still use limited participation 
as a device to generate imperfect price adjustment, but that provide a more 
detailed account of intermediary portfolio choice, may well prove to be very 
successful in modeling the lending view. 
7.3  Empirical Work on the Lending Channel 
There are a variety of  ways to organize a discussion of  the evidence that 
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simple correlations that are open to many  interpretations  and then  progres- 
sively introduce more focused tests that can be used to distinguish between 
competing  explanations.  Most  of  the  literature  either  exclusively  considers 
time-series correlations or cross-sectional correlations. While we too divide 
our discussion along these lines, we believe it is important to keep both bodies 
of evidence in mind in assessing the overall plausibility of the lending channel. 
After reviewing the evidence, we wrap up with some simple calculations aimed 
at quantifying the importance of the lending channel. 
7.3.1  Tests Using Aggregate Time-Series Data 
Perhaps the simplest implication of  the lending channel is that bank loans 
should be closely correlated with measures of economic activity. Figure 7.2 
graphs the change in nonfarm inventories (as reported in the National Income 
and Product Accounts) along with the change in commercial and industrial 
bank loans. The two series are highly correlated-the  correlation is 0.4. Simi- 
lar pictures can be drawn to show a strong correlation between bank loans and 
unemployment, gross national product (GNP), and other key macroeconomic 
indicators. 
In terms of establishing support for the lending channel, however, such cor- 
relations are inconclusive, because although they are consistent with the impli- 
cations of conditions  1  and 2, they also admit other interpretations. For ex- 
ample, it may be that the correlations are driven by changes in the demand for 
bank loans rather than the supply of bank loans (as required by condition  1). 
NIPA Inventories  .  .  .  -.  -.  .  C&l Loans  - 
Fig. 7.2  C and I loans and National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
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That is, bank loans and inventories might move together because banks always 
stand willing to lend, and firms finance desired changes in level of inventories 
with bank loans. And even if  the evidence does in part reflect the impact of 
variations in loan supply, it does not establish that these variations can be at- 
tributed to changes in monetary policy, as required by condition 2. 
We thus start by reviewing the data that bear more directly on condition 1- 
the question of whether shifts in loan supply matter. In fact, there is consider- 
able evidence that disruptions in the banking sector and the attendant shifts 
in bank loan supply are sometimes responsible for significant fluctuations in 
economic activity. One of the most influential of  these studies is Bernanke’s 
(1983) examination of  the Great Depression in the United States. Bernanke 
examines the extent to which the money view of monetary policy transmission 
can account for the decline in US. output between  1930 and 1933. He  finds 
that while a standard monetary model would predict a large drop in output, a 
significant amount of the decline cannot be explained by  appealing purely to 
monetary influences. Moreover, not only can much of the unexplained decline 
be rationalized by recognizing the disruptive effects of bank panics, but these 
panics (and associated financial crises) also seem capable of  explaining the 
persistence of the Depression. The Bernanke interpretation has become part of 
the conventional explanation for the depth and persistence of  the Depression 
in the United States and is one of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting 
the view that shifts in loan supply can be quite important. 
Bernanke, in subsequent work with James (1991), has extended this work to 
analyze the role of  Depression-era banking panics in countries besides the 
United  States. Studying a  sample of  twenty-four countries, Bernanke and 
James (1991) find that there are large output declines during periods of bank- 
ing panics that cannot be explained by  standard factors, such as trade effects, 
interest rates, fiscal policy, etc. Similar results have been uncovered in studies 
of different historical episodes in a number of countries. 
The literature on credit controls also suggests that disruptions of the lending 
process can be quite important (see Owens and Schreft 1992). Perhaps the 
clearest example is the  1980 Credit Controls initiated by  President Carter. 
Although the six-point credit-restraint program was only in place from March 
14 through July 3, it had a remarkable effect on borrowing and purchasing 
patterns (see Schreft 1990 for details). While the controls sought to discourage 
all types of credit extensions, in Schreft’s words, “the consumer credit controls 
were largely symbolic and without teeth.” However, the impact on bank lend- 
ing was very powerful. She reports that bank loans, which had been growing 
at an  annualized rate  of  between  15 and  20 percent prior to the controls, 
dropped to an annual growth rate of only 2.5 percent for the month of March. 
In April, total bank loans outstanding fell 5 percent (at an annual rate). The 
decline in activity was equally sharp. Real gross domestic product (GDP) con- 
tracted at a 9.9 percent annual rate in the second quarter of the year. Once the 
controls were lifted, loan growth and GDP growth resumed at a healthy pace. 
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ports the notion that shocks to loan supply have significant real effects. A note- 
worthy example is Bernanke (1986). Bernanke proceeds by imposing enough 
covariance restrictions on the disturbance terms in his equations to allow him 
to identify a structural shock to the intermediation process.  A representative 
example of his restrictions is that shocks to aggregate loans are contemporane- 
ously uncorrelated with shocks to military spending and money. Thus his iden- 
tifying assumptions permit a direct investigation of whether condition  1 holds. 
As he notes, a change in monetary policy is one of several candidates for fac- 
tors that might disturb the lending process. The resulting instrumental-variable 
estimates suggest that lending shocks do seem to have a sizable effect on ag- 
gregate  demand.  In  a  similar  vein,  Kuttner  (1992)  also finds  that  lending 
shocks are important for spending. 
Of course, for the lending view to be relevant we must go one step further 
and demonstrate that condition 2 also holds, that is, that monetary policy has 
the power to shift loan supply. This observation suggests examining the co- 
movements in the stance of monetary policy, loans, and activity, which in turn 
requires one to quantify the stance of monetary policy. Fortunately, the conclu- 
sions do not seem very sensitive to the use of any particular indicator of policy. 
For instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) find that increases in the federal 
funds rate (their measure of the stance of Federal Reserve policy) lead banks 
to slowly downsize by  shedding loans, and that as loans decline the economy 
slows. These findings are reproduced in figure 1.3.12 
Others researchers have also found that loans adjust gradually (but notice- 
ably) following a shift in policy. For instance, Romer and Romer (1990) report 
a similar finding when they date shifts in policy by studying the language in 
Federal Open Market Committee directives. Thus, there does seem to be solid 
evidence that loan volume responds (albeit with a lag) to changes in the stance 
of monetary policy. 
The slow adjustment of loans to policy may initially seem to undercut the 
plausibility of important effects coming through shifts in loan supply. For ex- 
ample, King (1 986) runs a horse race between loans and monetary aggregates 
and finds that the latter do a better job of predicting activity; or said differently, 
money tends to lead output while loans tend to move roughly contemporane- 
ously with output. Romer and Romer (1990) find similar results, and interpret 
them as cutting against the lending view. And recently, Ramey (1992) has re- 
confirmed these findings using a horse race based on a set of error-correction 
models.  l3 
12. These results seem to be a bit sensitive to  the choice of loan series. Bemanke and Blinder 
look at a loan series that captures all types of bank lending. If one instead focuses on lending to 
businesses (for example, Commercial and Industrial loans), loan volume initially increases follow- 
ing an interest-rate hike, but then turns around and begins to decline. As we discuss later, Morgan’s 
(1992) work suggests that this is due largely to the presence of loan commitments. 
13. Most of these contests show that M2 is the best monetary aggregate for predicting future 
output movements. However, from a theoretical perspective,  M2 contains many nontransaction 
components and therefore is not the most obvious candidate to use to defend the money view. 244  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
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Fig. 7.3  Responses to increase in funds rate (estimated 59:12-90:12) 
However, for a couple of reasons we do not think these timing differences 
are particularly damaging for the lending view. First, it is natural to believe 
that the most immediate consequence of  a slowdown would be an undesired 
buildup of  firms'  inventories. This would lead to a short-run increase in the 
demand for loans to finance the excess inventories. Thus even if loan supply is 
contracting, we may not observe a rapid decline in loan volume.14 
A second consideration, emphasized by  Bernanke and Blinder, is that the 
contractual nature of loan agreements limits the speed with which loan volume 
can shrink. Recent work by  Morgan (1992) confirms that much of the slug- 
gishness in loan volume is indeed due to loan commitments. Specifically, Mor- 
gan contrasts movements in C and I loans made under commitment with move- 
ments in C and I loans made without any commitment. In figure 7.3,  we saw 
that rising  interest rates are often followed initially by slightly lower unem- 
ployment (higher activity); and Morgan finds that the loans made under com- 
mitment largely  track these movements in activity. In contrast, he finds that 
customer loans that do not have commitments begin to fall relatively quickly, 
responding about as fast and as sharply as monetary aggregates. Thus, the re- 
sponse of loan supply to movements in monetary policy does seem quite plau- 
sible. 
However, even taking the effect of  loan commitments into account, it ap- 
14. Diamond (1991) also offers a theoretical model that suggests that the demand for intermedi- 
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pears that loan supply responds  to monetary policy  with some lag. This is 
important to note if one is interested in applying the Lucas-Fuerst style models 
discussed in section 7.2.3 to capture the lending view. As noted earlier, current 
versions of  these models generally predict very rapid responses of  loans to 
monetary policy: the nonparticipation constraints implicit in these models are 
temporary. Thus, one challenge in applying this class of models in this context 
will be to come up with a plausible modification that can rationalize the timing 
patterns between shifts in policy and changes in lending and output. 
Unfortunately, the observation that changes in monetary policy are followed 
by  changes in both loan quantities and economic activity still does not prove 
that condition 2 holds. For example, one way to read these results is that tight 
monetary policy operates through standard interest channels to depress eco- 
nomic activity and to reduce the demand for credit. Consequently, there can be 
an induced correlation between activity and bank lending even if there is no 
lending channe1.I5 This identification problem  means that although correla- 
tions between policy indicators, bank loans, and activity are consistent with 
the view that monetary policy works through loan supply, such evidence can- 
not provide unambiguous support of the lending view. 
One approach to dealing with this identification problem  is proposed  by 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) (KSW). They consider the relative fluctua- 
tions in bank loans and a leading substitute for bank loans: commercial paper. 
The central KSW insight is that movements in substitutes for bank financing 
should contain information about the demand for bank financing. For example, 
if bank loans are falling while commercial paper issuance is rising, then KSW 
infer that bank loan supply has contracted. 
Having made this identifying assumption, KSW propose testing both condi- 
tions 1 and 2.  To verify that the central bank can affect loan supply (condition 
2),  KSW examine movements in the “mix” between bank loans and loan sub- 
stitutes following changes in the stance of monetary policy.’6 Using both the 
Federal Funds rate and the Romers’ policy proxy, KSW find that when the Fed 
tightens, commercial paper issuance surges while loans (slowly) decline-that 
is, the move in the mix indicates loan supply has shifted inward.17  To study 
whether the implied shifts in loan supply are important (conditions 1 and 3), 
they add their mix variable to a set of  structural equations for inventory and 
fixed investment. Their tests boil down to checking whether the proxy for loan- 
15. However, this alternative explanation has to be stretched to explain Morgan’s findings: one 
must argue that the demand for loans from noncommitted borrowers falls much faster than the 
demand of the borrowers with commitments. 
16. KSW define their mix variable to be the ratio of bank loans to the sum of bank loans plus 
commercial paper. 
17. Miron, Romer, and Weil (chap. 8 in this volume) find that movements in the CP-loan mix 
are less clear cut in response to earlier historical episodes of tight policy, for example, those in the 
early part of the century. However, given the very different institutional makeup of the markets in 
these periods, it is unclear whether the results are directly comparable with those of  KSW. See 
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supply shifts has any additional explanatory power for investment once other 
fundamental factors such as the cost of capital are taken into account.’* 
KSW find that the mix does seem to have independent predictive power 
for investment, particularly  inventory investment. Since swings in  inventory 
investment are central to business cycles and because conventional interest- 
rate effects have proved difficult to find for inventories, these results are note- 
worthy. In other words, the KSW findings provide some support for the view 
that  monetary  policy  and financial factors may  be important for inventory 
movements even though standard security market interest rates do not have 
much predictive power for inventories. 
Hoshi, Scharfstein, and Singleton (199 1) conduct an analogous set of tests 
using aggregate Japanese data. Specifically, they compare the behavior of bank 
loans which were subject to informal control by the Bank of Japan with loans 
from insurance companies which were the main alternative to bank financing. 
They find that when the Bank of Japan tightens, the fraction of industrial loans 
coming from banks drops noticeably, confirming condition 2. They also find 
that in a four-variable VAR  (which includes interest rates) the mix is a signifi- 
cant  determinant  of  both  fixed investment  and  finished  goods inventories. 
Thus, the Japanese and US.  data give the same basic me~sage.’~ 
An alternative way of using information regarding substitutes for bank loans 
to resolve the identification problem is to study movements in relative prices 
rather than relative quantities. Specifically, changes in loan supply could be 
identified by checking whether the price of loans increases relative to the price 
of an alternative such as commercial paper. However, some care must be taken 
here since the nonprice terms of  bank credit (for example, collateral, cove- 
nants, etc.) may vary systematically over time. In this case, one might expect 
data such as the prime rate to be relatively uninformative about the true cost of 
bank loans, and hence less useful in resolving the identification problem.20 
Perhaps surprisingly, KSW also find evidence supporting both conditions 1 
and 2 using the gap between the prime rate and the commercial paper rate to 
gauge loan supply: when the Fed tightens, the prime rate rises relative to the 
commercial paper rate. Furthermore, movements in this spread help forecast 
investment,  even  controlling for the  cost  of  capital.  In  contrast,  however, 
Kuttner (1992), using simple VAR-type causality tests, shows that the spread 
between the prime rate and the commercial-paper rate is a poor predictor of 
output (much worse than the KSW quantity-based mix variable, which contin- 
18. A similar approach could be used to  extend the work by  Morgan. For instance, with an 
additional assumption that the demand for credit is the same for firms with and without bank 
commitments, the difference between the loans extended to the two sets of firms could be used to 
isolate shifts in loan supply. The gap between the two types of  loans could then be used as a proxy 
for loan supply instead of the KSW mix variable. 
19. Arguably, the Japanese evidence is less surprising since the Bank of Japan appears to exert 
some direct control over loan volume in addition to any indirect control that might come from 
changing reserves. 
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ues to perform strongly in the VAR-type tests.)*' Thus, the tests with price- 
based  indicators lead to qualitatively  similar conclusions  as the tests using 
quantity-based indicators, although the findings with the rate spreads seem to 
be less robust. 
Overall, we find the existing results based on aggregate data fairly support- 
ive of the lending view. We see a coherent body of evidence, starting with very 
simple correlations and moving through a fairly precise set of tests, that sug- 
gests that monetary transmission operates at least partially  through induced 
shifts in loan supply. However, we also recognize some important limitations 
that accompany this type of time-series analysis. For instance, one difficulty is 
that there are relatively few episodes where monetary policy shifts. In almost 
all of these cases, the shifts occur near recessions, so that many of the correla- 
tions we have discussed also could be uncovered by contrasting behavior dur- 
ing booms and busts. Since this sort of ambiguity is likely to be very difficult 
to resolve using only aggregate data, we think it is essential to examine other 
types of evidence. 
7.3.2  Tests Using Cross-Sectional Data 
There are good reasons to believe that studying cross-sectional data might 
be particularly helpful in this respect. For one, there is added variation that can 
be exploited in cross-sectional data. More specifically, there are a rich set of 
cross-firm implications of the lending view that are masked at the aggregate 
level. One key example is that not all firms are likely to be bank dependent, so 
some of the hypothesized effects implied by the lending view should occur for 
some firms  but not for others. The combination of more data and more precise 
implications of the theory suggests a powerful set of tests using microdata that 
can be used to complement the aggregate findings. 
While tests using cross-sectional data do offer considerable promise, they 
also come at a higher cost because these data require more effort to work with 
than do aggregate time-series data. At this point there has been relatively less 
work using microdata to specifically examine the lending view. A couple of 
notable exceptions are the recent papers by Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) and 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) that use information from the Quarterly Finan- 
cial Report, a survey of over seven thousand manufacturing firms, to contrast 
the behavior of  small and large firms. Under the assumption that small firms 
21. Work by Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1993) and Stock and Watson (1989) suggests that a 
different interest-rate spread, the difference between commercial paper and Treasury-bill rates, is 
a very reliable predictor of activity. These results might be interpreted as providing some indirect 
evidence on the lending view. For instance, if monetary policy does move loan supply and thus 
changes firms' financing patterns, then it seems likely that part of the movement in the bills/paper 
spread is due to shifts in monetary policy (see Bernanke 1990 and Friedman and Kuttner 1993 for 
details). However, in terms of the lending view, it is not clear why the bills/paper spread would 
perform so much better than the papedprime spread in different forecasting contests. This suggests 
that one area for future work will be to combine the information in different price and quantity 
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are much more likely to be bank dependent than larger firms, the comparisons 
bear on the lending view. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) begin by showing that bank loans to small firms 
decline significantly when the Fed raises interest rates, while large firms’ ag- 
gregate external financing actually rises. One explanation for the Gertler and 
Gilchrist findings might be that some large firms issue commercial paper to 
finance trade credit that they want to offer to their smaller customers, who have 
been cut off from bank financing.  In  this case, commercial paper and bank 
loans are aggregate substitutes (as assumed by KSW) even though only certain 
firms can directly issue commercial paper.22 
Moreover, Gertler and Gilchrist find that the inventory investment of small 
firms is much more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than that of large firms. 
This finding is compatible with the KSW aggregate evidence on inventories, 
and we will return to it shortly when we attempt to calibrate the magnitude of 
the lending channel. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) conduct a similar investiga- 
tion using imputed investment data for small and large manufacturing firms. 
They too find that small firms’ investment is more sensitive to movements in a 
proxy for the stance of the monetary policy. 
While this line of work produces conclusions that fit with the cross-sectional 
implications of the lending view, the relatively coarse level of disaggregation 
leaves open some other possibilities.  For example, it might simply be that for 
technological  reasons,  small  firms  are more  recession  sensitive  than  large 
This sort of objection can be partially  addressed by using firm-level 
data. 
Several recent papers can be interpreted as firm-level tests of the lending 
view. In each case, the authors first identify a set of liquidity-constrained firms 
and then investigate whether these liquidity constraints become more binding 
in the wake  of  a shift  in monetary  policy. To  the extent that the liquidity- 
constrained firms are to some degree bank dependent, this evidence bears on 
the lending view. 
Hoshi, Scharfstein, and Singleton (1991) (HSS) focus on a set of Japanese 
firms that would be susceptible to being cut off from banks during times of 
tight credit-firms  that are not part of  bank-centered industrial groups. HSS 
investigate whether these “independent” firms’ fixed investment becomes more 
sensitive to cash flow when monetary policy tightens. Until recently in Japan, 
assessing the stance of monetary policy was relatively straightforward because 
the Bank of  Japan (BOJ) explicitly made suggestions to banks about how much 
22. KSW do not commit to any particular microeconomic story to rationalize their assumption 
of the substitutability of commercial paper and bank loans. However, as long as the substitution 
of  trade credit for bank loans is imperfect, the KSW story makes sense. In other words, the KSW 
story in no way hinges on the existence of  marginal firms that shift between borrowing through 
banks or borrowing through the commercial paper market. 
23. See, however, Gertler and Hubbard (1989), who take issue with the view that small firms 
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lending to undertake. When the BOJ wanted to tighten it would urge banks to 
curtail their lending. And indeed, HSS find that when monetary policy is tight, 
liquidity is more impmtant for independent firms’ investment than in normal 
times. 
Gertler and Hubbard (1989) conduct a similar study with U.S. data. They 
build on the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) (FHP) result that the fixed 
investment of firms that do not pay dividends is much more sensitive to cash 
flow and liquidity than is the fixed investment of firms that have high dividend 
payout ratios. Accepting the FHP interpretation that this is evidence of liquid- 
ity constraints, it is possible to ask whether such constraints become more 
severe during periods of tight money. 
Studying the FHP sample from 1970 to 1984, Gertler and Hubbard find that 
the investment of the low-payout firms does indeed become more sensitive to 
cash flow during the 1974-75  and 1981-82  recessions. Given that tight mone- 
tary policy was a factor in both recessions (see Romer and Romer 1990), these 
findings lend further support to the lending view. However, as Gertler and Hub- 
bard note, the following alternative interpretation is also possible. If informa- 
tion about some borrowers is incomplete, they may be able to borrow more 
easily by posting collateral. During a recession, it may be that collateral values 
fall. In this case, even if bank loan supply does not shift inward, the decrease in 
collateral values would lead banks to lend less in equilibrium. Discriminating 
between this “collateral shock” explanation for the Gertler and Hubbard find- 
ing and the lending view is not easy. Both explanations stress the importance 
of a cutoff in bank lending as a contributing factor to the decline in investment, 
and differ only with respect to the source of this cutoff. 
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1992) (KLS) conduct a similar set of  tests 
using firm-level inventory data. They focus on the differences between publicly 
traded companies that do and do not have bond ratings. The nonrated compa- 
nies are typically much smaller than the rated companies and are likely bank 
dependent. Because of the myriad of evidence suggesting that Federal Reserve 
policy was restrictive prior to 1982, KLS begin their study with an examination 
of the 1982 recession. They find that during this episode, the inventory move- 
ments of the nonrated companies were much more dependent on their own 
cash holdings than were the inventory movements of the rated companies. (In 
fact, there is no significant liquidity effect for the rated companies.) 
In contrast, KLS find that during subsequent periods there is little relation 
between cash holdings and inventory movements for the nonrated companies. 
For instance, during 1985 and  1986, when KLS argue that monetary policy 
was particularly loose, the correlation between inventory investment and cash 
holdings is negative and completely insignificant. These findings further sup- 
port the KSW suggestion that financial factors beyond those captured by open- 
market interest rates play an important role in inventory movements during re- 
cessions. 
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also be interpreted as supporting the importance of  collateral shocks rather 
than the lending view. KLS present some additional tests that try to distinguish 
between the two explanations. KLS reason that if the collateral deterioration 
story is correct, then the cutoff in bank lending ought to be more pronounced 
for firms that have high debt levels (that is, firms that have limited amounts of 
uncommitted collateral  available). However, KLS find no systematic relation 
between  debt levels (relative to total assets) and the sensitivity  of  inventory 
investment to cash holdings. 
Overall, we read the firm-level evidence as echoing the story that emerges 
from both the aggregate data and the partially disaggregated Quarterly Finan- 
cial Report data. Several different  studies yield  the  same basic conclusion: 
during periods when monetary policy is tight, it appears that bank-dependent 
firms’ spending becomes more closely tied to the availability of internal fi- 
nance. 
7.3.3  Quantifying the Impact of the Lending Channel 
While we are quite confident in asserting that the lending channel exists, we 
are much less certain about its overall quantitative significance. The ideal way 
to assess the strength of the lending channel would be to estimate a fully speci- 
fied structural model that captures both the lending and money channels and 
then to simulate the impact of tightening of monetary policy. Unfortunately, at 
this point no such model exists. As a second best alternative, we discuss three 
imperfect but quite different approaches to calibrating the importance of  the 
lending channel. 
One set of estimates can be inferred from the work of  Kashyap, Stein, and 
Wilcox. Recall that they use a set of  standard structural models for inventory 
and fixed investment-that  already control for open-market interest rates and 
output-and  test whether their financing mix variable provides any additional 
explanatory power. The rough idea is that the mix captures that part of overall 
financing costs attributable to the lending channel. KSW find that the coeffi- 
cients on the mix are sufficiently big that a shock similar to the one that fol- 
lowed the Fed’s October 1979 shift in policy results in an extra 1 percent de- 
cline in GNP. As noted earlier, most of this extra adjustment takes place in 
inventories. It is also worth noting that by construction this estimate ignores 
any possible effects that might operate through other channels, such as con- 
sumers’ expenditures on durables. 
An alternative strategy would be to begin with the Gertler-Gilchrist compar- 
ison of the inventory behavior of small and large manufacturing firms. Using 
a VAR  framework, they find that there is a sharp difference in the way the two 
types of firms respond to a Romer date impulse: eight quarters after a Romer 
date, large-firm inventories are usually up by 5 percent, while small-firm inven- 
tories are typically down by  about  11 percent. The cumulative impact of  the 
small firms  is significant:  they  bring  the aggregate  inventory  accumulation 
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Making the (perhaps strong) assumption that the large-small differential is 
entirely attributable to the lending channel, this result suggests that the lending 
channel causes manufacturing inventories to be  3 percent lower than they 
would be otherwise. This implies a fairly modest effect in terms of GNP. For 
example, considering again the October 1979 shift in Fed policy, according 
to the Quarterly Financial Report the stock of manufacturing inventories was 
roughly 250 billion as of  the fourth quarter of  1979. A 3 percent decline in 
this  stock therefore represents about 0.30  percent  drop  in  GNP.  Accord- 
ing to Blinder and Maccini (1991, 76) manufacturing firms held an  average 
of  about 60 percent of  total manufacturing and trade inventories (between 
1959 and  1986). So,  if  one  assumes further  that  the  inventory  behavior 
of  the nonmanufacturing firms is similar to that of the manufacturing firms, 
then  the  total  economywide inventory effect  would  be  about  0.5  percent 
of  GNP (.5  = .30/.60). Thus, the size of  the effect as calibrated from the 
Gertler-Gilchrist data is roughly consistent with the effect reported by  KSW 
using aggregate data. 
Finally, to take a different tack, one might ask how much of  the potency of 
monetary policy can be confidently ascribed to the money view of transmis- 
sion. In other words, one might try to calibrate the magnitude of  the lending 
view by  working backwards: make an estimate of the importance of monetary 
policy, decide how much of  this can be traced to open-market interest-rate 
effects, and then impute any remaining effects to the lending channel. Of 
course this approach puts the “burden of proof” squarely on the money view, 
and therefore highlights the choices that one implicitly must make in calibrat- 
ing the size of these effects. 
This example is particularly provocative because interest-rate effects are no- 
toriously hard to find for many categories of investment spending. For instance, 
Blinder and Maccini (199  I, 82), in surveying the literature on inventories con- 
clude that empirical research “generally fails to uncover any influence of real 
interest rates on inventory investment, especially for finished goods in manu- 
facturing.” Given  the large role of  inventories in cyclical fluctuations, this 
should force a diehard believer in the money view to ask whether it is plausible 
to maintain that monetary policy has no direct effect on inventories. 
Similarly, direct attempts to estimate the relationship between real interest 
rates and aggregate output (usually under the guise of estimating the slope of 
the IS curve) often find that there is little relationship between the two. For 
instance, Hide and Kelleher (1990) survey the literature on the interest sensi- 
tivity of  the economy (and how  it might have  changed because of  financial 
market deregulation) and note that there is little consensus on whether real 
interest rates matter much. For instance, their own results suggest that there is 
no significant relationship between (short-term) real interest rates and output. 
This sort of  finding suggests that one could take an extreme stand and claim 
that all of monetary policy’s potency comes via a lending channel! While we 
think this claim is too strong, we think it is equally disingenuous to tilt a calcu- 252  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
lation so that the money channel by default gets the bulk of any unexplained 
variation. 
On the whole, the literature on the lending channel thus far does not very 
precisely  pin  down the quantitative importance of the effects. Some of  this 
problem arises because there is still no widely accepted theoretical model that 
both satisfactorily captures all the important potential channels and can be esti- 
mated. Not surprisingly the result is that one can come up with a wide range 
of  estimates. The KSW and Gertler-Gilchrist numbers suggest a meaningful 
though moderate impact, while the “name the residual strategy”-claiming  all 
of the non-interest-rate effects for the lending channel-suggests  a potentially 
huge impact. More careful attempts to narrow the range are likely to be one of 
the leading topics of work in this area. 
7.4  Conclusions 
This paper was designed to accomplish three goals. First, we wanted to clar- 
ify what is meant by the lending view of monetary policy transmission. Ulti- 
mately, the lending view boils down to the two-part  assertion that (a)  open- 
market  operations  affect the  supply of  bank  loans; and  (h)  that  these  loan 
supply shifts in turn affect both the magnitude of aggregate output and its com- 
position. The essential ingredient that underlies this mechanism is the imper- 
fect substitutability of bank loans and publicly issued bonds, both as corporate 
liabilities and as bank assets. 
In contrast, quantity rationing in the loan market is not necessary for there 
to be  a meaningful  lending  channel, although  in practice  such rationing is 
likely to be present to some degree. Thus, as we have defined things, the lend- 
ing view of monetary  policy transmission is a subset of the larger literature 
that connects financial market imperfections and the real economy. Of course, 
even if our narrow version of the lending channel does not apply, there may be 
other ways in which financial market imperfections shape the consequences of 
monetary policy (for example, Bemanke and Gertler 1989). 
Similarly, the lending view need not imply that the more traditional money 
channel of policy  transmission  is inoperative; clearly the two channels can 
coexist and can complement each other. Nonetheless, the distinction between 
the two is an important one: as we have stressed, the existence of a lending 
channel can influence both the potency and the distributional consequences of 
monetary policy, as well as the information content of a variety of indicators 
that policymakers look to. 
A second goal of  the paper was to outline the microfoundations  that are 
needed to rationalize the existence of  the lending channel. The bottom  line 
here is that while the large existing literature on financial contracting and inter- 
mediation already provides much of what is needed, there remain some thorny 
problems that have thus far received little formal modeling attention. One par- 
ticular area that would appear to require further work is that which corresponds 253  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
to condition 2-the  link between Fed-induced  shocks to reserves and the ag- 
gregate supply of intermediated loans. 
Our final goal was to collect the empirical evidence that bears on the lending 
view. In our view, the evidence for the existence of a lending channel is already 
quite strong-there  are a number of papers  that document facts that would 
be very difficult to explain under the pure money view  of  monetary policy 
transmission. Importantly, this evidence comes from a number of sources, uses 
both aggregate and cross-sectional data, and for the most part produces results 
that complement each other. 
While there is surely more work to be done in terms of building a definitive 
case for the existence of the lending channel, a perhaps more important (and 
difficult) task for future research is to provide a relatively precise assessment 
of its quantitative importance. At this point, we remain quite uncertain about 
the exact magnitude of the lending channel impacts across a variety of sectors. 
Learning more about these magnitudes will be of vital importance if this line 
of  research  is  ever to provide  anything  more than  qualitative  help  to poli- 
cyrnakers. 
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Comment  Martin Eichenbaum 
This paper provides a useful survey of recent theoretical and empirical work on 
what has become known as the “lending view” of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. My Comment focuses on two related questions pertaining to the 
empirical side of the paper. First, what is the nature of the identification prob- 
lem involved in trying to evaluate the importance of the “lending channel” that 
is emphasized in the lending view? Second, how convincing is the empirical 
evidence that the lending channel plays a quantitatively important role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism? 
My basic conclusions are as follows. The identification problems involved 
in isolating a lending channel are quite severe. Moreover, substantive inference 
seems to be quite sensitive to the set of  identifying assumptions used. When 
all is said and done, there is very little evidence to directly support the notion 
that the lending channel plays an important role in propagating the effects of 
changes in monetary policy. What evidence there is, is equally consistent with 
alternative interpretations  that  stress  the  economic determinants  of  the  ob- 
served heterogeneity among economic agents, like small and large firms. Dis- 
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tinguishing between these alternatives will require a detailed analysis of micro- 
economic data. As things  stand though,  the empirical claims made for the 
lending view have not been substantiated. 
According to Kashyap and Stein, all that is needed for the lending channel 
to be operative is that (a) some agents view bank credit as special, and (6) 
open-market operations shift the supply of bank credit. The vast majority of 
theoretical papers in this area make these concepts operational by  supposing 
that there are important asymmetric information problems in credit markets 
that lead to credit rationing of a subset of agents in the economy. 
To find evidence of the lending channel, you have to confront two identifica- 
tion problems. First, you  need to make identifying assumptions to isolate a 
measure of exogenous movements in monetary policy. Usually, this involves 
taking a stand on the monetary policy rule in effect over the sample period 
being considered. Second, you need to make a set of identifying assumptions 
to argue that the supply, rather than the demand for credit, has moved in re- 
sponse to a monetary policy shock. Typically this amounts to finding a differ- 
ential response of two sets of agents in the economy to a change in monetary 
policy and arguing that the differential response reflects the presence of the 
lending channel. The usual identifying assumption here is that, absent credit 
market imperfections, the agents would have reacted in the same way. The fact 
that they reacted differently is taken to be evidence of an operative lending 
channel. 
Keeping in mind these identification issues, what kind of evidence do Kas- 
hyap and Stein present? First, they point to a variety of unconditional correla- 
tions between economic activity and different loans. This is not helpful, as 
Kashyap and Stein themselves admit, since neither of the two identification 
problems is dealt with. Second, the authors present evidence that real shocks 
to the financial intermediation  sector matter. While very interesting, this is 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. Everyone agrees that output would decline if we 
blew up all the banks or imposed a large tax on what they produced. The ques- 
tion is not whether the activities of banks and financial intermediaries affect 
the economy. Of course they do. The question is how these activities respond to 
open-market operations. Third, Kashyap and Stein cite Bernanke and Blinder’s 
(1992) findings that following a shock to monetary policy, measured  as an 
orthogonalized innovation to the Federal funds rate, total bank lending and 
aggregate output fall. I agree with Kashyap and Stein that this is a very interest- 
ing finding. But nothing  whatsoever about the empirical importance of  the 
lending channel can be inferred from it. Absent further identifying assump- 
tions, we do not know if the fall in loans reflects a fall in the demand for loans 
or a fall in the supply of loans. 
Fourth, the authors discuss their own work with Wilcox, which analyzes 
relative fluctuations in bank loans and a leading substitute for bank loans, com- 
mercial paper. The basic idea is that if bank loans fall after a monetary policy 
shock while the stock of commercial paper rises, then we can conclude that 258  Anil K. Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein 
the supply of bank loans has contracted. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox find that, 
for their measures of shocks to monetary policy, the mix of bank loans (B)  to 
declines 
B 
the sum of bank loans plus commercial paper (0  falls, that is, ~ 
B+C 
after a contractionary monetary policy shock. This is interpreted as strong evi- 
dence for the importance of the lending channel. 
A critical problem with this evidence is that Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) 
does not reflect 
B 
and Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) show that the fall in  ~ 
B+C 
the substitution of any one agent from bank loans into commercial paper. In- 
stead the fall in bank loans and the rise in commercial paper occurs among two 
separate groups of borrowers. To begin with, all forms of large-firm debt (bank 
loans, commercial paper, and “other”) go up, not down, after a contractionary 
monetary policy shock. This may reflect the need to finance the rise in invento- 
ries that occurs at the beginning of a recession. The only debt that actually 
goes down is small-firm bank loans. Since the fall in bank loans and the rise 
in commercial paper pertain  to different economic agents, the mix  variable 
emphasized by  Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox cannot be viewed as a legitimate 
proxy  for the  supply of bank  loans.  It follows that the decline in  the  mix, 
B 
~  cannot be interpreted as evidence for the importance of the lending view. 
Still it is true that large and small firms appear to react differently to changes 
in monetary policy. Just how differently though depends on how we measure 
shocks to monetary policy. Suppose we identify shocks to monetary  policy 
with one of  the measures used by  Oliner and Rudebusch, namely, quarterly 
first differences of the Federal Funds rate. This corresponds to the (incredible) 
identifying assumption that all changes in the Federal Funds rate are policy 
induced and that the information  set which  the Federal Reserve uses when 
making those changes is uncorrelated with standard economic data. Proceed- 
ing as Oliner and Rudebusch did, I computed the sum of the coefficients  on 
the lagged policy variables and the t-statistics of that sum. In one regression I 
used the total (short-term) indebtedness of large manufacturing firms. In the 
other I used the total indebtedness of small manufacturing firms. In each case, 
total indebtedness consisted of the sum of bank loans, commercial paper, and 
“other” debt. The data were the same as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993). 
The sums of the coefficients and associated t-statistic for the large-firm re- 
gression are .019 and  1.48, respectively. The corresponding numbers for the 
small-firm regression  are  -.017  and 3.00. These results are consistent with 
Oliner and Rudebusch. In particular, the negative and highly significant sum of 
coefficients for the small firms is consistent with the view that after a monetary 
contraction, small firms face a constriction of bank credit that is not made up 
from other sources. Large firms increase their total indebtedness. 
I then considered a different and (to me) less incredible way of identifying 
B+C’ 259  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
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Fig. 7C.1  The response of large-firm loans 
monetary policy shocks. Proceeding as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), I as- 
sumed that the monetary authority sets the Federal funds rate as a function of 
current and past values of real GNP, the GNP deflator as well as past values of 
the Federal funds rate and total indebtedness of large and small manufacturing 
firms. A policy shock is identified with the least squares residual that arises 
when the Federal funds rate is regressed against these variables.' All data were 
quarterly and cover the period 1975:l to 1991:2. 
Figures 7C. 1 and 7C.2 display the dynamic response function of total dollar 
loans to large and small manufacturing firms following a positive orthogo- 
nalized innovation to the Federal funds rate. The dotted lines denote a one 
standard error band around the dynamic response function, that is, a 70 percent 
confidence interval. Notice that total short-term indebtedness of  small firms 
actually rises for roughly one and a half years after the shock to policy.2 In 
light of this result it seems very difficult to maintain the view that credit con- 
straints on small firms become much more binding after a monetary contrac- 
1. Specifically, I regressed the Federal funds rate on current and six lagged values of real GNP 
and the GNP deflator as well as six lagged values of the Federal funds rate and total indebtedness 
of large and small manufacturing firms. 
2. The same pattern emerges if we look at the total short-term indebtedness of corporate and 
noncorporate firms. Both rise in a statistically significant manner after a monetary contraction, 
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Fig. 7C.2  The response of small-firm loans 
tion. After all, small firms do manage to increase their total indebtedness after 
a monetary contraction. 
Even if the qualitative responses of small and large firms to monetary policy 
shocks are not very different, it is true that their quantitative responses are 
different. This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of  the lending view if 
we make the identifying assumption that, absent credit constraints, small firms 
would increase their total debt as much as large firms. This amounts to saying 
that the only factor distinguishing small and large firms is the degree to which 
they face credit constraints, that is, it is a matter of historical accident that 
some firms are large and some are small. Under this interpretation, what hap- 
pens after a monetary contraction is that the inventories of all firms rise after a 
contractionary shock to monetary p01icy.~  Firms need to finance these invento- 
ries and all firms, large and small, are able to do so. But small firms obtain less 
financing, perhaps because  they  are forced to go to higher-cost  sources of 
credit. The presumption is that this somehow contributes to the propagation 
of monetary shocks. Unfortunately, no explicit model of this effect has been 
developed nor has any evidence been offered regarding the quantitative impor- 
tance of this effect. 
A different interpretation builds on the notion that small firms are small for 
a reason. For example, the size distribution of firms across different industries 
3. The lending view has nothing to say about why this might be the case. 261  Monetary Policy and Bank Lending 
may be quite different. Small firms could be concentrated in cyclically sensi- 
tive industries or in industries were inventories do not build up as quickly at 
the onset of a recession. Then the differential response of small and large firms 
to changes in monetary policy has nothing to do with the frictions emphasized 
in the lending view. It simply reflects the underlying reasons for the size distri- 
bution of firms. As far as I know, the empirical plausibility of this interpretation 
has not yet been investigated. Until it has though, the current findings regarding 
the behavior of small and large firms cannot be used as evidence in favor of 
the lending view. 
Finally, I ought to say something about Kashyap and Stein’s analysis of the 
connection between the lending view and limited-participation models of the 
sort considered by  Robert Lucas, Tim Fuerst, and Lawrence Christian0 and 
myself. Frankly I found the discussion somewhat forced. Perhaps this is be- 
cause I think that any fully articulated version of the lending view will inevita- 
bly involve credit market imperfections. And there is no logical connection 
between limited participation and credit constraints. Fisher’s (1993) model is 
very interesting precisely because it allows for credit market imperfections in 
a limited participation setup. Among other things, this allows him to carefully 
distinguish and quantify the roles which the different frictions play in a general 
equilibrium model. 
In conclusion, I found the Kashyap and Stein paper useful along a number 
of dimensions. Certainly it clarified a number of issues for me. Still, I remain 
far from convinced that there is much evidence to support the notion that the 
credit or lending channel is a quantitatively important part of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. It may be. But the evidence to substantiate that posi- 
tion has not yet been developed. 
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